Monthly Archives: February 2021

The Postulates 31 … (old)

Please refer to Course in Subject Clearing.

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When we apply the method of SUBJECT CLEARING to the general knowledge we inevitably end up with the following postulates. 

POSTULATE # 31: Underlying an anomaly there is fixation of attention.

COROLLARY: Fixed attention generates anomalies.

Most people have their attention fixated on the body and identity. This leads to fixations on survival and politics. All reactions, as in obsessive-compulsive behavior, are fixations. When you are trying to locate an anomaly, follow the trail of fixation of attention. When you are trying to resolve an anomaly, work out the anatomy of fixations involved. Illusions arise when there are fixations. When you recognize fixations for what they are, you free yourself from them.

Fixations on body appear in the belief that one is just the body. Such a person is fixated on taking care of the body. He rarely have “out-of-body” experiences. Attention gets centered on the body as new sensations are encountered; but when that attention is suppressed it gets fixated there. Attention definitely gets fixated on the body when there are shocks, accidents, and illnesses.

In Scientology, attention gets fixated on individuality when one makes an effort to resolve present and past identities. The attention naturally settles in exploring the environment. For remedies of fixated attention refer to the POSTULATES 26, 27 and 28.

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[To be continued…]

The Postulates 26 – 30 (old)

Please refer to Subject Clearing Self.

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When we apply the method of SUBJECT CLEARING to the general knowledge we inevitably end up with the following postulates. 

POSTULATE # 26: The ability to resolve anomalies increases as the viewpoint becomes broader. 

COROLLARY: The viewpoint is as broad as it is not fixated and is free to consider.

The narrowest viewpoint is one that is stuck in some mystery. The biggest mystery is when the viewpoint is unconsciousness. As the viewpoint starts to become conscious it becomes aware of the mystery. It finds itself waiting for something to come up, or happen. As it becomes aware of waiting it starts to feel anxious about its survival, and its attention gets fixated on reproducing itself. As it moves beyond the anxiety of sex, its attention gets fixated on eating. It even consumes thoughts and ideas in their literal, symbolic form. It must then overcome its fixation on  “figure-figure” type of thinking. As it moves beyond this level, it makes effort to collect data and analyze it. Beyond that it simply starts to rely on emotions. As the attention gets freed up from these fixations the viewpoint is increasingly able to see things as they are, to directly know about them, to become aware of what it does not know, and finally, to know fully.

The technique of meditation that helps this broadening of viewpoint is provided at Meditation from Mystery to Knowing. The viewpoint, ultimately, becomes free of all fixed ideas, biases, prejudices and other filters and, knows things in their totality.

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POSTULATE # 27: Meditation with the discipline of mindfulness helps solve anomalies.

DEFINITION: The discipline of mindfulness helps overcome filters that one may be looking through.

Anomalies exist because the viewpoint is unable to get full and clear picture of a situation. This is partly because it is unwittingly looking through certain filters. We know these filters as prejudices, biases, fixed ideas, etc.; but the person is simply not aware of them. In meditation, the Discipline of Mindfulness allows the person to view the subject of meditation clearly without such filters. This discipline is essential when meditating on “mystery to knowing” as covered in Postulate # 26. 

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POSTULATE # 28: Resolution of anomalies is further supported by Subject Clearing.

DEFINITION: Subject Clearing is detecting the basic postulates, assumptions and erroneous ideas present in a subject.

Anomalies also exist partly because the information is not sorted out fully. In the Information Age of today, there is plenty of data available, but skill is required to sort out the relevant data from deceptive, misleading and irrelevant information. One must identify what is really missing and be able to research it. A person can very quickly learn this skill by using the procedure of Subject Clearing. This procedure helps detect and clear up assumptions and erroneous ideas present in a subject. Subject clearing and meditation with the discipline of mindfulness go hand-in-hand. 

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POSTULATE # 29: The attention field continues while the identities disintegrate and regenerate.

COROLLARY: The recycling of identities supports the evolution of the attention field. 

Death is the disintegration of identities into energy. From that energy new identities are generated. This recycling of identities is essential for the evolution of the attention field, which is the true self. Only the discrete identities (made up of bodies and mental matrices) die and take birth. The continuum of attention field, which is the integrated awareness of the universe, never perishes. The true eternal self is the attention field. Anomaly comes about when the self starts to believe that it is an identity. When this happens, the self gets trapped into worrying about life and death.

A soul is the idea promoted by some religions that your identity continues after death. What continues is the attention field. A religion giving hope for a finite identity to survive forever is an anomaly. One should let the identity live and die with dignity.

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POSTULATE # 30: The root cause of all human troubles is the attachment to an identity (individualism).

COROLLARY: Trouble arises when individualism is given priority over the natural goals of family, groups, state, country, mankind, life, and the universe.

Ideally, the goals of an individual should be consistent with the natural goals of family, groups, state, country, mankind, life organisms, etc. When individual goals are in conflict, but still given a higher priority, then we have individualism at play. A good example of individualism is the anomalies in politics that undermine the natural growth and well being of a country. Whenever selfish intentions take priority over the welfare of family and the community, we have trouble. Peace and prosperity arise when individual goals and actions are consistent with the natural goals of family, groups, state, country, mankind, life organisms, etc.

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PLATO: The Psychological Problem

Reference: The Story of Philosophy

Note: The original Text is provided below.
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But behind these political problems lies the nature of man; to understand politics, we must, unfortunately, understand psychology. “Like man, like state” (575); “governments vary as the characters of men vary; … states are made out of the human natures which are in them” (544); the state is what it is because its citizens are what they are. Therefore we need not expect to have better states until we have better men; till then all changes will leave every essential thing unchanged. “How charming people are!—always doctoring, increasing and complicating their disorders, fancying they will be cured by some nostrum which somebody advises them to try, never getting better, but always growing worse. … Are they not as good as a play, trying their hand at legislation, and imagining that by reforms they will make an end to the dishonesties and rascalities of mankind—not knowing that in reality they are cutting away at the heads of a hydra?” (425). 

Let us examine for a moment the human material with which political philosophy must deal. 

Human behavior, says Plato, flows from three main sources; desire, emotion, and knowledge. Desire, appetite, impulse, instinct—these are one; emotion, spirit, ambition, courage—these are one; knowledge, thought, intellect, reason—these are one. Desire has its seat in the loins; it is a bursting reservoir of energy, fundamentally sexual. Emotion has its seat in the heart, in the flow and force of the blood; it is the organic resonance of experience and desire. Knowledge has its seat in the head; it is the eye of desire and can become the pilot of the soul. 

These powers and qualities are all in all men, but in divers degrees. Some men are but the embodiment of desire; restless and acquisitive souls, who are absorbed in material quests and quarrels, who burn with lust of luxuries and show, and who rate their gains always as naught compared with their ever-receding goals: these are the men who dominate and manipulate industry. But there are others who are temples of feeling and courage, who care not so much what they fight for, as for victory “in and for itself”; they are pugnacious rather than acquisitive; their pride is in power rather than in possession, their joy is on the battle-field rather than in the mart: these are the men who make the armies and navies of the world. And last are the few whose delight is in meditation and understanding; who yearn not for goods, nor for victory, but for knowledge; who leave both market and battle-field to lose themselves in the quiet clarity of secluded thought; whose will is a light rather than a fire, whose haven is not power but truth: these are the men of wisdom, who stand aside unused by the world. 

Now just as effective individual action implies that desire, though warmed with emotion, is guided by knowledge; so in the perfect state the industrial forces would produce but they would not rule; the military forces would protect but they would not rule; the forces of knowledge and science and philosophy would be nourished and protected, and they would rule. Unguided by knowledge, the people are a multitude without order, like desires in disarray; the people need the guidance of philosophers as desires need the enlightenment of knowledge. “Ruin comes when the trader, whose heart is lifted up by wealth, becomes ruler” (484) ; or when the general uses his army to establish a military dictatorship. The producer is at his best in the economic field, the warrior is at his best in battle; they are both at their worst in public office; and in their crude hands politics submerges statesmanship. For statesmanship is a science and an art; one must have lived for it and been long prepared. Only a philosopher-king is fit to guide a nation. “Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and wisdom and political leadership meet in the same man, … cities will never cease from ill, nor the human race” (478). 

This is the key-stone of the arch of Plato’s thought. 

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PLATO: The Political Problem

Image result for The Political Problem

Reference: The Story of Philosophy

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Justice would be a simple matter, says Plato, if men were simple; an anarchist communism would suffice. For a moment he gives his imagination reign: 

First, then, let us consider what will be their way of life. … Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are housed they will work in summer commonly stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barley and wheat, baking the wheat and kneading the flour, making noble puddings and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat of reed or clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds of yew or myrtle boughs. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and having the praises of the gods on their lips, living in sweet society, and having a care that their families do not exceed their means; for they will have an eye to poverty or war. … Of course they will have a relish—salt, and olives, and cheese, and onions, and cabbages or other country herbs which are fit for boiling; and we shall give them a dessert of figs, and pulse, and beans, and myrtle-berries, and beech-nuts, which they will roast at the fire, drinking in moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after them (372). 

Observe here the passing reference to the control of population (by infanticide, presumably), ‘to vegetarianism, and to a ”return to nature,” to the primitive simplicity which Hebrew legend pictures in the Garden of Eden. The whole has the sound of Diogenes the “Cynic,” who, as the epithet implied, thought we should “turn and live with the animals, they are so placid and self-contained”; and for a moment we are likely to classify Plato with St. Simon and Fourier and William Morris and Tolstoi. But he is a little more skeptical than these men of kindly faith; he passes quietly on to the question, Why is it that such a simple paradise as he has described never comes?—why is it that these Utopias never arrive upon the map?

He answers, because of greed and luxury. Men are not content with a simple life: they are acquisitive, ambitious, competitive, and jealous; they soon tire of what they have, and pine for what they have not; and they seldom desire anything unless it belongs to others. The result is the encroachment of one group upon the territory of another, the rivalry of groups for the resources of the soil, and then war. Trade and finance develop, and bring new class-divisions. “Any ordinary city is in fact two cities, one the city of the poor, the other of the rich, each at war with the other; and in either division there are smaller ones—you would make a great mistake if you treated them as single states” (423). A mercantile bourgeoisie arises, whose members seek social position through wealth and conspicuous consumption: “they will spend large sums of money on their wives” (548). These changes in the distribution of wealth produce political changes: as the wealth of the merchant over-reaches that of the land-owner, aristocracy gives way to a plutocratic oligarchy—wealthy traders and bankers rule the state. Then statesmanship, which is the coordination of social forces and the adjustment of policy to growth, is replaced by politics, which is the strategy of party and the lust for the spoils of office. 

Every form of government tends to perish by excess of its basic principle. Aristocracy ruins itself by limiting too narrowly the circle within which power is confined; oligarchy ruins itself by the incautious scramble for immediate wealth. In either case the end is revolution. When revolution comes it may seem to arise from little causes and petty whims; but though it may spring from slight occasions it is the precipitate result of grave and accumulated wrongs; when a body is weakened by neglected ills,· the merest exposure may bring serious disease (556). “Then democracy comes: the poor overcome their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing the rest; and give to the people an equal share of freedom: and power” (557). 

But even democracy ruins itself by excess—of democracy. Its basic principle is the equal right of all to hold office and determine public policy. This is at first glance a delightful arrangement; it becomes disastrous because the people are not properly equipped by education to select the best rulers and the wisest courses (588). “As to the people they have no understanding, and only repeat what their rulers are pleased to tell them” (Protagoras, 317); to get a doctrine accepted or rejected it is only necessary to have it praised or ridiculed in a popular play (a hit, no doubt, at Aristophanes, whose comedies attacked almost every new idea). Mob-rule is a rough sea for the ship of state to ride; every wind of oratory stirs up the waters and deflects the course. The upshot of such a democracy is tyranny or autocracy; the crowd so loves flattery, it is so “hungry for honey,” that at last the wiliest and most unscrupulous flatterer, calling himself the “protector of the people” rises to supreme power (565). (Consider the history of Rome.) 

The more Plato thinks of it, the more astounded he is at the folly of leaving to mob caprice and gullibility the selection of political officials—not to speak of leaving it to those shady and wealth-serving strategists who pull the oligarchic wires behind the democratic stage. Plato complains that whereas in simpler matters—like shoe-making—we think only a specially-trained person will serve our purpose, in politics we presume that every one who knows how to get votes knows how to administer a city or a state. When we are ill: we call for a trained physician, whose degree is a guarantee of specific preparation and technical competence—we do not ask for the handsomest physician, or the most eloquent one; well then, when the whole state is ill should we not look for the service and guidance of the wisest and the best? To devise a method of barring incompetence and knavery from public office, and of selecting and preparing the best to rule for the common good—that is the problem of political philosophy. 

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PLATO: The Ethical Problem

Reference: The Story of Philosophy

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The discussion takes place in the house of Cephalus, a wealthy aristocrat. In the group are Glaucon and Adeimantus, brothers of Plato; and Thrasymachus, a gruff and excitable Sophist. Socrates, who serves as the mouthpiece of Plato in the dialogue, asks Cephalus: 

“What do you consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from wealth?” 

Cephalus answers that wealth is a blessing to him chiefly because it enables him to be generous and honest and just. Socrates, after his sly fashion, asks him just what he means by justice; and therewith lets loose the dogs of philosophic war. For nothing is so difficult as definition, nor anything so severe a test and exercise of mental clarity and skill. Socrates finds it a simple matter to destroy one after another the definitions offered him; until at last Thrasymachus, less patient than the rest, breaks out “with a roar”:

“What folly has possessed you, Socrates? And why do you others all drop down at one another’s feet in this silly way? I say that if you want to know what justice is, you should answer and not ask, and shouldn’t pride yourself on refuting others. … For there are many who can ask but cannot answer” (336). 

Socrates is not frightened; he continues to ask rather than answer; and after a minute of parry and thrust he provokes the unwary Thrasymachus to commit himself to a definition: 

Listen, then,” says the angry Sophist, “I proclaim that might is right, and justice is the interest of the stronger. … The different forms of government make laws, democratic, aristocratic, or autocratic, with a view to their respective interests; and these laws, so made by them to serve their interests, they deliver to their subjects as ‘justice,’ and punish as ‘unjust’ anyone who transgresses them. … I am speaking of injustice on a large scale; and my meaning will be most clearly seen in autocracy, which by fraud and force takes away the property of others, not retail but wholesale. Now when a man has taken away the money of the citizens and made slaves of them, then, instead of swindler and thief he is called happy and blessed by all. For injustice is censured because those who censure it are afraid of suffering, and not from any scruple they might have of doing injustice themselves” (338-44). 

This, of course, is the doctrine which our own day more or less correctly associates with the name of Nietzsche. “Verily I laughed many a time over the weaklings who thought themselves good because they had lame paws.” Stirner expressed the idea briefly when he said that “a handful of might is better than a bagful of right.” Perhaps nowhere in the history of philosophy is the doctrine better formulated than by Plato himself in another dialogue, Gorgias, (483 f), where the Sophist Callicles denounces morality as an invention of the weak to neutralize the strength of the strong. 

They distribute praise and censure with a view to their own interests; they say that dishonesty is shameful and unjust—meaning by dishonesty the desire to have more than their neighbors; for knowing their own inferiority, they would be only too glad to have equality. … But if there were a man who had sufficient force (enter the Superman), he would shake off and break through and escape from all this; he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws, that sin against nature. … He who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost; but when they have grown to their greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to them, and to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural justice and nobility. But the many cannot do this; and therefore they blame such persons, because they are ashamed of their own inability, which they desire to conceal; and hence they call intemperance base. … They enslave the nobler natures, and they praise justice only because they are cowards. 

This justice is a morality not for men but for foot-men (oude gar andros all’ andrapodou tinos) ; it is a slave-morality, not a hero-morality; the real virtues of a man are courage (andreia) and intelligence (phronesis).

Perhaps this hard “immoralism” reflects the development of imperialism in the foreign policy of Athens, and its ruthless treatment of weaker states. “Your empire,” said Pericles in the oration which Thucydides invents for him, “is based on your own strength rather than the good will of your subjects.” And the same historian reports the Athenian envoys coercing Melos into joining Athens in the war against Sparta: “You know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question for equals in power; the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.” We have here the fundamental problem of ethics, the crux of the theory of moral conduct. What is justice?—shall we seek righteousness, or shall we seek power?—is it better to be good, or to be strong?

How does Socrates—i.e., Plato—meet the challenge of this theory? At first he does not meet it at all. He points out that justice is a relation among individuals, depending on social organization; and that in consequence it can be studied better as part of the structure of a community than as a quality of personal conduct. If, he suggests, we can picture a just state, we shall be in a better position to describe a just individual. Plato excuses himself for this digression on the score that in testing a man’s vision we make him read first large type, then smaller; so, he argues, it is easier to analyze justice on a large scale than on the small scale of individual behavior. But we need not be deceived: in truth the Master is patching two books together, and uses the argument as a seam. He wishes not only to discuss the problems of personal morality, but the problems of social and political reconstruction as well. He has a Utopia up his sleeve, and is resolved to produce it. It is easy to forgive him, for the digression forms the core and value of his book. 

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