Western Psychological Development (11-18th century)

Reference: SC: Psychology

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Medieval Foundations (11th–14th Centuries)

Medieval Western psychology operated within a Christian-Aristotelian synthesis that viewed the psyche as fundamentally embodied. The rational soul served as the “form” of the body, with mental processes understood as integrated physiological-psychological phenomena rather than purely mental events. This period established crucial conceptual foundations:

Mind-Body Integration: Unlike later Cartesian dualism, medieval thinkers understood cognition as a two-part process where physiological brain mechanisms mirrored rational soul processes, with neither reducible to the other. Observations of head injuries confirmed Galen’s localization of rational aspects in the brain, though popular notions of the heart as the seat of understanding persisted.

Emotion Theory: Emotions (passions) were conceived as natural responses of the sensitive appetite to external events, neither inherently good nor evil until directed by reason and will. This contrasted sharply with the Stoic view that emotions constituted disturbances requiring elimination. Medieval literature, such as Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, depicted love-sickness as both mental and bodily illness, with psychosomatic symptoms reflecting the integrated nature of affective experience.

Faculty Psychology: William of Ockham (1317–1349) revolutionized psychological theory by unifying the rational soul with its faculties. Rejecting previous distinctions between soul and rational powers, Ockham argued for identity between the soul’s essence and its capacities. His principle of ontological parsimony—commonly called Occam’s Razor—eliminated unnecessary multiplication of entities in psychological explanation. Ockham further developed the concept of intuitive cognition, a uniquely human awareness that perceived objects exist and possess particular qualities, bridging sensory data and intellectual understanding.

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Renaissance Transformation (15th–16th Centuries)

The Renaissance marked psychology’s emergence from purely metaphysical speculation toward empirical observation, driven by humanist emphasis on individual personality and the printing press’s dissemination of knowledge.

Empirical Methodology: Juan Luis Vives (1493–1540) pioneered observational psychology in his De anima et vita (1538), applying analytical methods that prefigured Bacon and Descartes. Vives advanced several revolutionary concepts:

  • Physiological Psychology: He maintained that mental capacities depended on bodily temperament, arguing maladaptive behavior could be treated as physical illness requiring medical care rather than moral condemnation.
  • Faculty Analysis: Vives systematically examined the soul’s three faculties—mind, will, and memory—while exploring topics from sleep and dreams to longevity.
  • Emotion Theory: Rejecting Stoic suppression of emotions, Vives viewed them as essential constituents of human life, natural responses to how things appear.

Therapeutic Humanism: Vives advocated compassionate treatment of mental disorders, prescribing individualized instruction for mild cases and medical intervention for severe conditions. This humane approach contrasted with medieval harshness and anticipated modern therapeutic ethics.

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Enlightenment Systematization (17th–18th Centuries)

The Enlightenment crystallized psychology’s shift toward scientific rationalism, establishing foundational concepts for modern experimental psychology.

Philosophical Revolution: Descartes’ Cogito ergo sum (1637) and Newton’s Principia (1687) provided methodological templates for analyzing mental phenomena through reason and empirical evidence. Enlightenment thinkers synthesized 17th-century rationalist metaphysics (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz) with British empiricism (Locke, Hume), creating hybrid frameworks for understanding human nature.

Emotion Theory Development: Seventeenth and eighteenth-century philosophers developed sophisticated analyses of emotions (passions, affects), often employing hydraulic models where pains and pleasures pushed ideas through associative mechanisms. Key developments included:

  • Spinoza and Descartes: Both sought “remedies” for passions through rational control, viewing emotional regulation as central to virtue and happiness.
  • Associationist Psychology: Hume and others developed “Newtonian” ambitions for a “science of man,” explaining emotions through principles of association.
  • Moral Sentiment Theory: Rousseau traced emotional genesis through social structure changes, while other thinkers emphasized cultivation of moral sentiments.

Medical Model Advancement: By the 18th century, mental illness treatment increasingly paralleled physical medicine. Harsh treatment gave way to compassionate care, with comprehensive approaches incorporating nutrition, exercise, sleep, emotional regulation, and environmental hygiene. The stigma surrounding mental illness diminished as pathological conditions were viewed through medical rather than moral frameworks.

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Psychology Timeline East (1st–10th century CE)

Reference: SC: Psychology

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1st–10th century CE

  • c. 1st–4th century CE – Classical Sāṅkhya and Yoga coalescence
    Sāṅkhya’s dualist metaphysics of puruṣa (pure consciousness) and prakṛti (mind–matter) and its doctrine of three guṇas become the standard theoretical frame for Indian psychological discourse; the Sāṅkhyakārikā (c. 3rd–4th century) systematizes this.
  • c. 2nd century CE – Full Theravāda Abhidhamma Piṭaka in scholastic use
    By around this time the seven Theravāda Abhidhamma books are complete and function as a full-scale “manual of Buddhist psychology,” analyzing consciousness episodes moment by moment.
  • c. 150–250 CE – Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka
    Nāgārjuna’s work on śūnyatā (emptiness) deconstructs any fixed essence of self or phenomena, providing a radical psychometaphysical critique of reification and attachment.
  • c. 2nd–5th century CE – Tattvārtha Sūtra of Umāsvāti
    The Jain Tattvārtha Sūtra (c. 2nd–5th century) codifies a full Jain psychology: types of cognition, structure of jīva, karmic influx, bondage, and methods for cessation and shedding of karmic “matter”.
  • c. 3rd–5th century CE – Pātañjala Yoga Sūtra
    The Yoga Sūtra (often placed c. 3rd–4th century CE) formalizes the definition of yoga as citta‑vṛtti‑nirodha, articulates five vṛttis, kleshas, samskāras, and the eightfold path as a graded method of restructuring consciousness.
  • c. 4th–5th century CE – Yogācāra (Asaṅga, Vasubandhu)
    Yogācāra introduces the ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness), the eightfold model of consciousness, and the three natures theory, providing a multi‑layered account of conscious and unconscious processes and their transformation.
  • c. 5th–7th century CE – Mature Abhidharma and Buddhist logic
    Later Abhidharma scholastics refine phenomenological maps of mind; Dignāga (c. 5th–6th c.) and Dharmakīrti (7th c.) build a sophisticated epistemology of perception and inference that shapes all later Indo‑Tibetan psychology.
  • 602–664 CE – Xuanzang’s translation project
    The Chinese monk Xuanzang studies Yogācāra and Abhidharma in India (629–645) and returns to Chang’an with 657 texts, transmitting Indian psychological doctrines to East Asia and catalyzing Chinese Yogācāra and consciousness‑only schools.
  • c. 6th–7th century CE – Formation of Chinese Chán (Zen)
    By Sui–Tang times, Chán develops as a distinctive meditation-centered Buddhism in China, emphasizing immediate insight into mind‑nature (Buddha‑nature) through contemplative practice rather than discursive analysis.
  • c. 7th century CE – Wonhyo in Korea
    Wonhyo (617–686) formulates “One Mind” and Tongbulgyo (interpenetrated Buddhism), harmonizing diverse doctrines as expressions of a single psychological reality of mind, influencing Korean and East Asian Buddhist psychology.
  • c. 7th–10th century CE – Early Kashmir Śaivism
    Kashmir Śaiva systems (Trika, Pratyabhijñā, etc.) elaborate a non‑dual psychology where consciousness (Śiva) is intrinsically luminous and creative, and bondage is a contracted mode of awareness to be expanded through specific contemplative methods.
  • c. 8th–9th century CE – Śaṅkara and Advaita Vedānta
    Śaṅkara (traditionally c. 788–820) systematizes non‑dual Vedānta, distinguishing the witnessing consciousness (sākṣin) from mind’s modifications and using sravaṇa–manana–nididhyāsana as a graded cognitive therapy for avidyā (ignorance).
  • c. 10th–11th century CE – Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita
    Rāmānuja (c. 1017–1137) articulates a relational psychology of self as a part of Brahman, giving primacy to bhakti (devotional feeling) and śaraṇāgati (surrender) as transformative mental practices.
  • c. 10th–11th century CE – Abhinavagupta’s synthesis
    Abhinavagupta (c. 950–1020) integrates Kashmir Śaivism and aesthetics into a comprehensive theory of consciousness, recognition (pratyabhijñā), and aesthetic–spiritual experience, open to householders and non‑renunciates.

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Psychology Timeline East (Ancient history – BCE)

Reference: SC: Psychology

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Ancient history – BCE

  • c. 2600–1900 BCE – Indus Valley Civilization
    Iconography suggests early yogic/meditative postures and concern with inner states, though not yet systematized as explicit psychology.
  • c. 1500–1200 BCE – Early Vedic Period (Ṛgveda)
    Vedic hymns introduce early notions of manas (mind), sattva–rajas–tamas as qualitative traits, and distinguish mental from physical affliction in ritual-healing contexts.
  • c. 1000–600 BCE – Later Vedic / Upaniṣadic Emergence
    Principal Upaniṣads begin to take shape; they analyze states of consciousness (waking, dream, deep sleep, and samādhi), the relation of ātman and mind, and introduce explicit practices of self‑inquiry (ātma‑vicāra).
  • c. 600–400 BCE – Early Upaniṣads and Vedānta
    The major classical Upaniṣads (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, etc.) are composed, offering detailed accounts of cognition, memory, desire, and the psychosomatic linkage of thought, breath, and health.
  • c. 6th century BCE – Historical Buddha and Early Buddhism
    Gautama Buddha formulates the Four Noble Truths and Eightfold Path as a diagnostic–therapeutic model of suffering, with a phenomenological account of craving, perception, and the no‑self (anātman) doctrine.
  • c. 6th–5th century BCE – Jaina and early Buddhist psychological doctrines
    Early Jaina and Buddhist texts analyze karmic conditioning of mind, types of cognition, and structured paths of purifying attention and emotion (e.g., mindfulness of body, feeling, mind, dhammas).
  • c. 5th–4th century BCE – Classical Upaniṣads complete
    Upaniṣadic corpus largely stabilized; Vedāntic analyses of self, mind, and liberation become the primary “high theory” of Indian psychological thought.
  • c. 4th–3rd century BCE – Abhidharma beginnings
    The earliest Abhidharma texts appear, initiating the systematic taxonomic analysis of mental factors (cetasikas), momentary dharmas, and cognitive processes in Theravāda and other schools.
  • c. 3rd–2nd century BCE – Aśokan and early scholastic period
    Growth of Buddhist monastic centers supports more technical Abhidharma work and debate; mental phenomena are classified with increasing precision for contemplative training.
  • c. 2nd–1st century BCE – Bhagavad Gītā
    The Gītā (often dated roughly between 200 BCE and 200 CE) presents a psychologically rich dialogue: Arjuna’s crisis, analysis of anxiety and despondency, typology of guṇa‑based personalities, and four yogas as integrated methods of cognitive–emotional transformation.

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Psychology (1-1000 CE): Comparative Analysis

Reference: SC: Psychology

Divergent Paths and Shared Insights

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Epistemological Frameworks

The first millennium of the Christian Era witnessed fundamentally different trajectories in Eastern and Western approaches to mental illness, yet certain themes emerged across cultures that suggest universal aspects of human psychological understanding.

Western approaches oscillated between naturalistic and supernatural explanations. The Greco-Roman medical tradition established by Hippocrates, systematized by Celsus, and elaborated by Galen provided a coherent naturalistic framework based on humoral imbalance and brain pathology. However, the rise of Christianity introduced competing supernatural explanations centered on sin, demonic possession, and divine punishment. Byzantine medicine preserved the Greco-Roman naturalistic tradition while existing within a Christian cultural matrix, creating a complex synthesis. The Desert Fathers developed a third approach—neither purely naturalistic nor crudely supernatural—that understood mental afflictions as spiritual-psychological states requiring disciplined cognitive and contemplative interventions.

Eastern approaches generally maintained more consistent naturalistic frameworks while integrating spiritual dimensions without contradiction. Indian Ayurvedic medicine understood mental illness through the lens of dosha imbalance while accommodating supernatural etiologies (the agantuja category of unmada) without allowing them to dominate the medical framework. Buddhist psychology grounded mental suffering in the universal mechanisms of attachment, aversion, and ignorance, locating the problem and the solution entirely within the structure of consciousness itself. Chinese medicine integrated emotional and physiological dimensions seamlessly, viewing mental disorders as disruptions in the flow of qi and imbalances among organ systems. Islamic medicine synthesized Greek, Persian, and Indian knowledge while firmly rejecting supernatural explanations, insisting that mental illness was a medical condition requiring rational treatment.

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Therapeutic Modalities

Despite diverse theoretical frameworks, practical therapeutic interventions showed remarkable convergence across cultures. Pharmacological treatments were universal: Western physicians prescribed various herbal compounds, purgatives, and dietary modifications; Ayurvedic medicine employed extensive materia medica tailored to dosha imbalances; Chinese medicine developed complex herbal formulas; Islamic physicians like Alexander of Tralles and Al-Razi utilized hundreds of pharmaceutical preparations.

Psychotherapeutic interventions emerged independently across traditions. Roman physicians like Asclepiades advocated humane treatment including “light, music, and hydrotherapy”. Galen emphasized “counsel and education”. Ayurvedic texts prescribed treatments through “knowledge, specific knowledge, restraint, memory, and concentration”, using “exposure of the patient to mutually contradictory psychic factors” for emotional disturbances. Buddhist psychology developed systematic cognitive techniques for removing intrusive thoughts that closely parallel modern CBT. The Desert Fathers created contemplative practices for “guarding the heart” and managing the “demon of acedia”. Islamic physicians like Al-Razi pioneered psychotherapy, emphasizing positive therapeutic relationships and using sudden emotional reactions to catalyze healing.

Environmental and occupational therapies appeared across cultures. Greek and Roman physicians recommended travel, exercise, and pleasant environments. Byzantine hospitals provided comprehensive care. Islamic bimaristans employed “occupational therapy, aromatherapy, baths, and music therapy”. Chinese medicine emphasized appropriate environmental conditions for emotional balance. The convergence suggests these approaches addressed genuine therapeutic needs recognized across diverse cultural contexts.

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The Role of Spirituality and Religion

The relationship between religious/spiritual frameworks and mental health treatment varied significantly. In the Christian West, increasing religious dominance often displaced medical frameworks, though this was neither universal nor uncontested. Byzantine physicians maintained professional medical approaches while practicing Christianity. Monastic psychology, rather than rejecting naturalistic understanding, developed sophisticated introspective techniques grounded in systematic observation of mental states.

In the East, spiritual and medical frameworks achieved greater integration. Ayurvedic medicine embedded treatment within a comprehensive philosophical worldview without the spiritual dimension overwhelming medical observation. Buddhism developed psychological systems that were simultaneously therapeutic practices and paths to enlightenment—the distinction between treating mental illness and achieving awakening was one of degree rather than kind. Chinese medicine integrated spiritual concepts like Shen with physiological observation seamlessly. Islamic medicine, while deeply embedded in Islamic civilization, insisted on the medical nature of mental illness and rational treatment, achieving a synthesis where faith informed ethics without dictating medical theory.

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Institutional Developments

The development of specialized institutions for mental health care emerged most dramatically in the Islamic world with Al-Razi’s psychiatric ward and the bimaristan system. While Byzantine hospitals included medical care and Western monasteries provided refuge for the mentally distressed, these institutions did not develop the specialized, systematic approach to psychiatric treatment seen in Islamic medicine. The bimaristans represented “centers of healing, where monks utilized a combination of herbal remedies, dietary regulations, and spiritual rituals to address physical and mental health issues”, but with explicit medical organization and trained physician staff.

Chinese and Indian contexts developed different institutional patterns. While hospitals existed in ancient India and China, the available evidence from this period does not document specialized psychiatric facilities comparable to the Islamic bimaristans. However, monastic communities in both Buddhist and Hindu contexts provided structured environments for mental cultivation and healing, functioning as therapeutic communities even if not formally organized as medical institutions.

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Psychology (1-1000 CE): The Islamic Revolution

Reference: SC: Psychology


The Birth of Psychiatric Medicine (9th-11th Centuries CE)

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The Founding of Psychiatric Institutions

The Islamic Golden Age (roughly 8th-13th centuries CE) witnessed the most revolutionary advances in the treatment of mental illness during the first millennium. Islamic physicians synthesized Greek, Persian, and Indian medical knowledge while making groundbreaking innovations that would not be matched in the West until the modern era.

Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Zakariya Al-Razi (Rhazes, 865-925 CE) achieved a milestone in psychiatric history by establishing the first dedicated psychiatric ward in Baghdad. This represented a paradigmatic shift in how mental illness was conceptualized and treated. Al-Razi “viewed mental illnesses as conditions that required medical intervention, challenging the prevalent notions that attributed such ailments to supernatural causes or moral failings”. His approach was “revolutionary for his time”—he insisted that “mental disorders should be recognized and treated as medical conditions”.

In these psychiatric wards, Al-Razi “conducted thorough clinical observations of patients with psychiatric conditions and implemented treatment strategies involving diet, medication, occupational therapy, aromatherapy, baths, and music therapy”. The comprehensiveness of treatment reflected a holistic understanding that mental illness affected the whole person. Al-Razi “gave priority to the doctor-patient relationship” and “advised physicians on how to keep the respect and confidence of their patients”, recognizing that the therapeutic relationship itself was curative.

Al-Razi developed innovative psychotherapeutic approaches that anticipated modern psychotherapy by a millennium. He “advocated for psychotherapy,” emphasizing that “positive remarks from doctors could uplift patients, enhance their well-being, and facilitate a faster recovery”. He believed that “a sudden, intense emotional reaction could rapidly improve psychological, psychosomatic, and organic disorders”, employing what he called “a simple but dynamic approach” to psychotherapy. In one famous case, Al-Razi treated Prince Mansur of Ray for severe joint pain through an elaborate psychological intervention—staging an emotionally shocking confrontation in a bathhouse that successfully mobilized the prince to move when conventional treatments had failed.

Al-Razi made crucial diagnostic distinctions. He clarified that “a Majnun (insane) is not epileptic, as an epileptic person is otherwise healthy except during seizures”. He distinguished different types of melancholia, noting that “the reason is merely misdirected” rather than destroyed. Remarkably, he “asserted that religious compulsions could be overcome by reason to achieve better mental health,” accomplishing “a primary form of cognitive therapy for obsessive behavior”. He also advocated that “mental health and self-esteem are crucial factors influencing a person’s overall health”, anticipating modern biopsychosocial models.

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Comprehensive Biopsychosocial Systems

Abu Zayd al-Balkhi (9th century CE) was “the first to discuss the interconnectivity between physical and mental well-being by linking illness with the nafs (self/soul) to the development of physical ailments”. In his treatise Masalih al-Abdan wa al-Anfus (“Sustenance of the Body and Soul”), he “developed approaches that we would now view as cognitive and talking therapy”. Al-Balkhi’s interventions included instructing individuals “to keep helpful cognitions at hand during times of distress,” employing “persuasive talking, preaching, and advising,” differentiating “between normal and extreme emotional responses to situations,” and studying “the development of coping mechanisms for anger, fear, sadness, and obsessions”. This framework, connecting cognitions and pathological behaviors, bears striking resemblance to modern cognitive behavioral therapy.

Al-Balkhi was also notable for “distinguishing between neuroses and psychosis, classifying neuroses into four categories: fear and anxiety (al-khawf wa al-faza’), anger and aggression (al-ghadab wa al-haraq), sadness and depression (al-huzn wa al-inhizam), and obsessions (al-waswas)”. This categorical system demonstrated sophisticated clinical observation and represented an early psychiatric nosology.

Al-Akhawayni Bukhari (?-983 CE) gained such renown for his treatment of mentally ill patients that he became known as “Bejeshk-e Divanehgan” (The Doctor of the Insane). His work Hidayat contained detailed chapters on various mental conditions: “Mania,” “Malikhulia” (Melancholia), “Kabus” (Nightmare), “Ghotrab” (Dementia), and “Khonagh-o-Rahem” (Conversion Disorder). Al-Akhawayni made the crucial observation that melancholia “results from the impact of black bile on the brain”, explicitly localizing mental illness in neurological substrates.

He classified patients with melancholia into distinct subtypes based on clinical presentation. The first group exhibited “fear with no definite etiology, self-laughing, self-crying, and speaking meaninglessly”—symptoms we would now associate with major depressive disorder with psychotic features. A second group claimed to possess stunning abilities, “introduced themselves as a prophet or king,” or believed they had “turned into other beings, like hens and roosters, and mimicked their behaviors”—presentations consistent with grandiose delusions seen in bipolar disorder with psychotic features or schizophrenia. Al-Akhawayni emphasized nutritional interventions, believing that “some foods, such as wholemeal bread, beef, and salted fish, can be beneficial to the melancholics’ condition”.

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The Synthesis of Avicenna

Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980-1037 CE) produced The Canon of Medicine, which “was the basis for studying medicine in the East and the West for multiple centuries”. The Canon “discusses, among other things, the structure of psychological apparatus of human being and the connection of psychological functions with the brain as well as the role of psyche in etiology of somatic diseases”. Avicenna’s work represented the pinnacle of medieval understanding of mental illness, integrating philosophical psychology with clinical observation.

Avicenna provided detailed phenomenological descriptions of mental disorders. He distinguished between early and chronic phases of melancholia: the early phase involved “suspicions of evil, fear without cause, quick anger, involuntary muscle movements, dizziness, and tinnitus,” while the chronic phase showed “moaning, deep suspicion, profound sadness, restlessness, and delusions” including fears “that the sky may fall on one’s head” or of “being swallowed by the earth”. Avicenna was “among the first physicians to document that anger often serves as a transitional state between melancholic depression and mania—what psychiatry now calls the ‘switch’ phenomenon”.

Remarkably, Avicenna recognized what “wouldn’t be formally recognized by modern psychiatry for nearly a millennium: what we now call ‘mixed states,’ where features of depression and mania occur together”. He noted that some melancholic patients would show “increased libido, involuntary laughter, and even grandiose thoughts like imagining ‘that one is king’”.

Avicenna explored the psychology of death anxiety, identifying it as “a universal fear” with three cognitive causes: “(a) ignorance as to what death is, (b) uncertainty of what is to follow after death and (c) supposing that after death, the soul may cease to exist”. This analysis demonstrated sophisticated understanding of how cognitive interpretations generate emotional states.

Avicenna’s understanding of psychosomatic medicine was centuries ahead of his time. “He recognized the influence of emotional and mental states on physical health, suggesting that pain perception could be shaped by factors such as stress, anxiety, and sadness,” while “positive emotions and mental tranquility could reduce it”. This dual focus on psychological and physical conditions made it “critical for physicians to address both” aspects of patient care.

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Institutional Care and Cultural Context

The Islamic world developed sophisticated institutional care for mental illness through bimaristans (hospitals). These institutions had “separate wards for different illnesses, patients suffering from anxiety or showing signs of psychological distress were treated” with comprehensive modalities. The Mansuri Hospital in Cairo provided “medical treatment for Muslim patients, male and female, rich and poor, from Cairo and the countryside”, emphasizing accessibility regardless of social status. These hospitals included “lecture rooms, a library, as well as a chapel and a mosque”, integrating medical education with treatment.

The cultural context was crucial: “During the Islamic Golden Age, mental disorders were seen as phenomena that existed, requiring clinical assessment and treatment, and categorized and assessed systematically by employing rational judgements and observation rather than cultural beliefs based on supernatural causes”. While “the use of religious and medical forms of healing co-occurred—for instance, the use of prayer and ritual healing in addition to using treatments according to the medical model of the time”—the medical framework remained primary. This stood in stark contrast to medieval Christian Europe, where “discourse of mental illness as result of demons, spirits, spiritual distress, and sin dominated”.

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Notes:

  1. Nafs (نَفْس) is an Arabic word meaning the self, soul, psyche, or ego, central to Islamic thought, representing the inner self with desires, emotions, and free will, having both negative (commanding evil) and positive (tranquil) states, requiring spiritual struggle to tame its lower instincts (like lust, anger) towards a higher, peaceful state, often described in stages (like the commanding self, reproaching self, tranquil self). It’s the aspect of the spirit interacting with the physical body, driving actions and choices, distinct from the pure spirit (ruh) but linked to it. 

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