Reference: The Nature of the Physical World
This paper presents Chapter III (section 1) from the book THE NATURE OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD by A. S. EDDINGTON. The contents of this book are based on the lectures that Eddington delivered at the University of Edinburgh in January to March 1927.
The paragraphs of original material are accompanied by brief comments in color, based on the present understanding. Feedback on these comments is appreciated.
The heading below links to the original materials.
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Astronomer Royal’s Time
I have sometimes thought it would be very entertaining to hear a discussion between the Astronomer Royal and, let us say, Prof. Bergson on the nature of time. Prof. Bergson’s authority on the subject is well known; and I may remind you that the Astronomer Royal is entrusted with the duty of finding out time for our everyday use, so presumably he has some idea of what he has to find. I must date the discussion some twenty years back, before the spread of Einstein’s ideas brought about a rapprochement. There would then probably have been a keen disagreement, and I rather think that the philosopher would have had the best of the verbal argument. After showing that the Astronomer Royal’s idea of time was quite nonsensical, Prof. Bergson would probably end the discussion by looking at his watch and rushing off to catch a train which was starting by the Astronomer Royal’s time.
Whatever may be time de jure, the Astronomer Royal’s time is time de facto. His time permeates every corner of physics. It stands in no need of logical defence; it is in the much stronger position of a vested interest. It has been woven into the structure of the classical physical scheme. “Time” in physics means Astronomer Royal’s time. You may be aware that it is revealed to us in Einstein’s theory that time and space are mixed up in a rather strange way. This is a great stumbling-block to the beginner. He is inclined to say, “That is impossible. I feel it in my bones that time and space must be of entirely different nature. They cannot possibly be mixed up.” The Astronomer Royal complacently retorts, “It is not impossible. / have mixed them up.” Well, that settles it. If the Astronomer Royal has mixed them, then his mixture will be the groundwork of present-day physics.
We have to distinguish two questions which are not necessarily identical. First, what is the true nature of time? Second, what is the nature of that quantity which has under the name of time become a fundamental part of the structure of classical physics? By long history of experiment and theory the results of physical investigation have been woven into a scheme which has on the whole proved wonderfully successful. Time—the Astronomer Royal’s time—has its importance from the fact that it is a constituent of that scheme, the binding material or mortar of it. That importance is not lessened if it should prove to be only imperfectly representative of the time familiar to our consciousness. We therefore give priority to the second question.
But I may add that Einstein’s theory, having cleared up the second question, having found that physical time is incongruously mixed with space, is able to pass on to the first question. There is a quantity, unrecognized in pre-relativity physics, which more directly represents the time known to consciousness. This is called proper-time or interval. It is definitely separate from and unlike proper-space. Your protest in the name of commonsense against a mixing of time and space is a feeling which I desire to encourage. Time and space ought to be separated. The current representation of the enduring world as a three-dimensional space leaping from instant to instant through time is an unsuccessful attempt to separate them. Come back with me into the virginal four-dimensional world and we will carve it anew on a plan which keeps them entirely distinct. We can then resurrect the almost forgotten time of consciousness and find that it has a gratifying importance in the absolute scheme of Nature.
There is quite a disagreement on the subject of time. Time and space can be seen as separate and independent of each other. This is the case when time is seen as an interval; then it is definitely unlike space. This is the “particles in void” perspective.
But time and space can also be seen to be mixed up with each other. From “continuum of substance” perspective time may be seen as duration of substance, while space is seen as extension of substance. To have duration something must be extending, and to have extension something must be enduring.
But first let us try to understand why physical time has come to deviate from time as immediately perceived. We have jumped to certain conclusions about time and have come to regard them almost as axiomatic, although they are not really justified by anything in our immediate perception of time. Here is one of them.
If two people meet twice they must have lived the same time between the two meetings, even if one of them has travelled to a distant part of the universe and back in the interim.
An absurdly impossible experiment, you will say. Quite so; it is outside all experience. Therefore, may I suggest that you are not appealing to your experience of time when you object to a theory which denies the above statement? And yet if the question is pressed most people would answer impatiently that of course the statement is true. They have formed a notion of time rolling on outside us in a way which makes this seem inevitable. They do not ask themselves whether this conclusion is warranted by anything in their actual experience of time.
A sense of time comes from experiencing changes. Here the person who has traveled far in the interim, experiences many more changes than the other person. Therefore, time has passed much quickly for this person compared to the other. The sense of time for each person is different. This is a local view of time.
However, the end points of the sequence of changes for either person are the same. They represent a sequence of changes in the physical universe, which are universal for every person. This is a universal view of time.
Although we cannot try the experiment of sending a man to another part of the universe, we have enough scientific knowledge to compute the rates of atomic and other physical processes in a body at rest and a body travelling rapidly. We can say definitely that the bodily processes in the traveler occur more slowly than the corresponding processes in the man at rest (i.e. more slowly according to the Astronomer Royal’s time). This is not particularly mysterious; it is well known both from theory and experiment that the mass or inertia of matter increases when the velocity increases. The retardation is a natural consequence of the greater inertia. Thus so far as bodily processes are concerned the fast-moving traveler lives more slowly. His cycle of digestion and fatigue; the rate of muscular response to stimulus; the development of his body from youth to age; the material processes in his brain which must more or less keep step with the passage of thoughts and emotions; the watch which ticks in his waistcoat pocket; all these must be slowed down in the same ratio. If the speed of travel is very great we may find that, whilst the stay-at-home individual has aged 70 years, the traveler has aged 1 year. He has only found appetite for 365 breakfasts, lunches, etc.; his intellect, clogged by a slow-moving brain, has only traversed the amount of thought appropriate to one year of terrestrial life. His watch, which gives a more accurate and scientific reckoning, confirms this. Judging by the time which consciousness attempts to measure after its own rough fashion—and, I repeat, this is the only reckoning of time which we have a right to expect to be distinct from space—the two men have not lived the same time between the two meetings.
A body nearly at rest and a body travelling rapidly with certain natural velocity will differ in their inertia. The body nearly at rest will have higher inertia and, therefore, its processes will be slower compared to the body traveling rapidly. The conclusions given in the book in terms of relativity are ambiguous because you need a third body to determine which of the two bodies is traveling faster; and if you do not have a third body you cannot make that determination.
The conclusion, “the mass or inertia of matter increases when the velocity increases,” is questionable because a body traveling at a high but uniform velocity cannot be distinguished from a body at rest. Therefore, it is not velocity but acceleration that would influence mass or inertia of the body.
Reference to time as estimated by consciousness is complicated by the fact that the reckoning is very erratic. “I’ll tell you who Time ambles withal, who Time trots withal, who Time gallops withal, and who he stands still withal.” I have not been referring to these subjective variations. I do not very willingly drag in so unsatisfactory a time-keeper; only I have to deal with the critic who tells me what “he feels in his bones” about time, and I would point out to him that the basis of that feeling is time lived, which we have just seen may be 70 years for one individual and 1 year for another between their two meetings. We can reckon “time lived” quite scientifically, e.g. by a watch travelling with the individual concerned and sharing his changes of inertia with velocity. But there are obvious drawbacks to the general adoption of “time lived”. It might be useful for each individual to have a private time exactly proportioned to his time lived; but it would be extremely inconvenient for making appointments. Therefore the Astronomer Royal has adopted a universal time-reckoning which does not follow at all strictly the time lived. According to it the time-lapse does not depend on how the object under consideration has moved in the meanwhile. I admit that this reckoning is a little hard on our returned traveler, who will be counted by it as an octogenarian although he is to all appearances still a boy in his teens. But sacrifices must be made for the general benefit. In practice we have not to deal with human beings travelling at any great speed; but we have to deal with atoms and electrons travelling at terrific speed, so that the question of private time-reckoning versus general time-reckoning is a very practical one.
The time lived is subjective, but the changes in the physical universe during that same period shall be objective. I do not think that the watch carried by those two people, if they are exactly alike in inertia, will provide different time.
Time slows and space contracts only when quantization and/or inertia increases. And with increasing quantization and/or inertia, the natural speed of the substance decreases. Time and space are not affected by uniform speed. They are influenced only by acceleration.
Thus in physical time (or Astronomer Royal’s time) two people are deemed to have lived the same time between two meetings, whether or not that accords with their actual experience. The consequent deviation from the time of experience is responsible for the mixing up of time and space, which, of course, would be impossible if the time of direct experience had been rigidly adhered to. Physical time is, like space, a kind of frame in which we locate the events of the external world. We are now going to consider how in practice external events are located in a frame of space and time. We have seen that there is an infinite choice of alternative frames; so, to be quite explicit, I will tell you how I locate events in my frame.
Where the material-substance is concerned, the constitution of time changes little with changes in inertia. Of course, the local or subjective viewpoints of time can be very different from the universal or objective viewpoint of time. However the constitution of time can change appreciably with change in quantization of the field-substance. Science uses the universal or objective viewpoint of time.
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